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The Niigata Prefecture suffered two big disasters in 
2004.  The Niigata Flood occurred on July 13 and 
caused 15 deaths, 13 of which were senior citizens.  Of 
those 13 deaths, 8 were 75 or older.  The disaster 
reminded the public that disaster-prevention measures for 
the elderly are necessary.   
The Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake occurred on 
October 23 and had 1) long-lasting aftershocks, 2) 
evacuations by the village units, 3) officials advised a 
wide area to evacuate, and 4) substantial damage to the 
life line, which resulted in a larger number of evacuees 
and more senior citizens needed care. The aim of this 
study is to gather basic data on the response to the elderly, 
to show the necessity for disciplined disaster 
management care, and to develop a systematic approach 
to the disaster process for seniors under dramatic changes 
in social environment. 
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Synopsis
     This study is aim for gathering the basic data of the response to elders and showing the 
necessity of constructing the discipline of disaster management care, the systematic approach to 
the disaster process of elders under the drastic social environmental changes. Two case studies 
were conducted to clarify the disaster process of the elders in two disasters. The major findings 
were as follows: 1) The care managers as the professionals licensed by the government-sponsored 
Long-Term Care Insurance System worked effectively to manage the needs of moving temporarily 
to care facilities, 2) 13% of elders, who moved to the care facilities as temporary shelters, still 
stayed in the care facilities 6 months after the impact. Those results suggested that care managers 
should be the more effective agent to respond elders in disasters; however, they need to learn the 
disaster process of elders. 
Keywords: disaster care management, Long-Term Care Insurance System, care manager, aging 
society
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Fig.1  Age Distribution of Casualties in 2 Disasters 
Niigata Flood
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2. The 2004 Niigata Flood   
2.1 Purpose of Research in the Case of Niigata Flood 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the reason 
for the concentration of elderly victims in the Niigata 
flood on July 13, 2004 and propose an appropriate 
measure for reducing the number of victims of flood 
disasters in the future.  There are tens of thousands of 
people classified as elderly living in the districts stricken 
by the flood.  It is essential to analyze the reasons why 
only twelve elderly persons lost their lives and what 
factors made these persons different from others.   
Possible factors include the physical properties of the 
hazard, the geographical characteristics of the districts 
where the victims lived, and the personal attributes of the 
victims.  This study aims to clarify and combine these 
factors and determine the causes of death in this disaster.  
In other words, this study aims to “profile” the causes of 
death.
2.2 Method of Survey in the Case of Niigata Flood 
2.2.1 Subject s of disaster area 
Sanjo City, Niigata Prefecture was the subject area 
in Survey (1) on “the Niigata Flood on July 13”. 
According to Hayashi et. al.(2005), the Kakenhi (Grants 
in Aid for Scientific Research) report, four patterns of 
death were observed in “the Niigata Flood on July 13”.  
Deaths were caused by 1) a landslide, 2) house 
destruction by gushing water, 3) moving outdoors after 
the house was flooded well above the floor level, 4) 
remaining in a house flooded well above the floor level.  
It was determined that most of the deaths of the elderly 
who normally needed daily care were caused by 4) 
remaining in a house flooded well above the floor level. 
Therefore, we collected data to assess this issue. We 
mailed the questionnaires to the subjects and asked them 
to return the completed survey via mail.   We mailed 
the questionnaires on March 18, 2005 and collected them 
until April 5, 2005.  Toward the end of March, 
reminders were mailed to those who had yet to return 
their questionnaires. 
2.2.2 Subjects of this survey 
Participants in Survey (1) included 1) leaders and 
sub-leaders of community associations in the area where 
the elderly victims lived, 2) nursing-care insurance 
service providers, who provided services in the subject 
area, and 3) care managers, who were caring for the 
elderly victims.  Care managers are nation-certified 
specialists, who have special knowledge and techniques, 
which help senior citizens receiving care to lead an 
independent daily life. 
2.3 Results of Survey in the Case of Niigata Flood 
(1) The conditions that surrounded the deaths of the 
elderly care receivers 
On July 13, 2004 at 13:07, the left bank of the 
Igarashi River at Suwa (Magaribuchi) broke. The 
surveyed area (Rannan, Sanjo City, which is on the west 
Table 1. Situations when the People who Needed Assistance Died in the Niigata Flood
Community
association
Community Association A Community Association B
Attributes Female, 87, walking with a
cane, living alone
Female, 76, needed nursing
care, living alone
Female, 84, needed nursing
care, living alone
Male, 77, confined to bed
Estimated
time of death
13th in the afternoon 13th around 20:00 13th in the afternoon 13th  around 17:00
Time the body
was found




In between the flooded
kitchen and living room in
her house
In the flooded water on the
first floor of her house
In the flooded living room in
her house
In the flooded water on the
first floor of his house
Cause of
death
There are traces of the flood
up to 130 cm above the floor
in her house.  It seems that
she stayed home without
being able to evacuate by
herself and drowned in the
rush of the flood
It seems that a neighbor
initially carried her to the
second floor, but she later
went downstairs by herself
for some reason and
drowned, probably as she
fell
There are traces of flooding
to 110 cm above the floor in
her house.  It appears that
she stayed home without
being able to evacuate by
herself and drowned in the
rush of the flood
He was confined to bed and
received nursing care at
home.  He drowned in his
house that was flooded 120
cm above the floor level,




side of the Shinetsu Line, the railroad) was a little far 
from the broken bank.  Flooding began at 15:00 or later 
and reached 1.5 m. In the interview, the leaders and 
sub-leaders of community associations uniformly told 
that 1) they assumed it was “a typical flood” since the 
surrounding area had frequently flooded, 2) although the 
official advice to evacuate was issued at 11:40, they were 
unaware that an evacuation had been issued, 3) when the 
floodwater rose swiftly, all they could do was to go 
upstairs, 4) they felt that the residents of their community 
association would manage to survive the flood by 
themselves since the seniors lived by themselves.  
The four senior citizens, who died in this area, were 
75 or older and they all died in their homes.  The 
interview revealed that these four people “needed some 
assistance to walk”, or “could not walk by themselves”.  
It was confirmed that three of them were receiving 
in-home nursing care services, but at the time of flood, 
none were receiving care from a caregiver (Table 1). 
(2) Action taken for the elderly care receivers in the 
Niigata Flood 
Care managers and nursing care workers have 
become social resources to assist the elderly since many 
senior citizens that live in their own homes receive 
nursing care insurance.  Those professionals essentially 
worked well during the disaster.  However, one reason 
for the elderly deaths is that there was not a systematic 
emergency preparedness plan for community care 
managers. It was also concluded that there was a clear 
gap in understanding the senior citizens’ needs between 
the nursing care workers and the leaders and sub-leaders 
of community associations or district welfare officers. 
3. The 2004 Mid-Niigata Earthquake 
3.1 Purpose of Research in the Case of 2004 
Mid-Niigata Earthquake
The Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake occurred on 
October 23 and had 1) long-lasting aftershocks, 2) 
evacuations by the village units, 3) officials advised a 
wide area to evacuate, and 4) substantial damage to the 
life line, which resulted in a larger number of evacuees 
and more senior citizens needed care. The aim of this 
study is to gather basic data on the response to the elderly, 
to show the necessity for disciplined disaster 
management care, and to develop a systematic approach 
to the disaster process for seniors under dramatic changes 
in social environment. 
3.2 Survey 1:  Social Random Sampled Survey in 
the impacted Areas  
3.2.1 Subject s of disaster area 
The survey was conducted in Ojiya City and 
Kawaguchi Town where the casualties and damage to 
the houses were serious throughout the area.  Both male 
and female adults living in this area participated in this 
survey.  The adopted method was stratified two-stage 
sampling.  Initially, 50 spots in this area were randomly 
selected: 43 spots in Ojiya City and 7 spots in 
Kawaguchi Town, which is proportional to the 
population ratio.  Then a sampling was conducted with 
the probability proportional to size.  Using the basic 
registers of the residents, we sampled 20 individuals, 
which did not reside in the same household, from each 
spot.  We specified the individual to complete the 
survey so that an equal number of male and female 
subjects were sampled.  Consequently, 1,000 subjects 
were sampled, i.e., 2.19% of the population in the area 
(45,668 persons as of March, 2005).  
We mailed the questionnaires to the subjects and 
asked them to return the completed survey via mail.   
We mailed the questionnaires on March 18, 2005 and 
collected them until April 5, 2005.  Toward the end of 
March, reminders were mailed to those who had yet to 
return their questionnaires. 
3.2.2 Basic Attributes 
We collected 543 responses (response rate: 
54.3%).  Responses, which 1) were partially or not 
completed, 2) were error laden, 3) did not specify sex or 
age, and 4) were from individuals that did not reside in 
Ojiya City or Kawaguchi Town during the earthquake, 
were excluded.  Hence, 518 completed surveys were 
collected (effective response rate: 51.8%).   
To ensure random sampling, we verified that the 
respondents reflected the features of the general 
population in terms of basic attributes, i.e., sex and age 
(generation).  The number of households and estimated 
population per municipality (as of March 1, 2005) and 
the estimated population per age (5-year increments) 
(aggregate) (as of January 1, 2005), which was published 
by the Emergency Management and Disaster Division, 
Niigata Prefecture Government, was used to determine 
the basic attributes of the general population. 
The result of the goodness-of-fit test did not show 
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significant differences in sex and age (generation) 
between the respondents and the general population 
(sex:X2(1)=0.85, n.s., generation:X2(2)=5.82, n.s.).  
Since there were not significant differences in the basic 
attributes, it was concluded that respondents do represent 
the tendencies of the area.  
3.2.3 The Results of the Survey 1 
Fig. 2 showed 80% of people who lived in the 
impacted Area because many numbers of Aftershocks 
were occurred (over 500 times of aftershocks were 
occurred from Oct 23-31), while 10.6 % of the people 
chose to stay at home. 20.1% of them were evacuated to 
open spaces, 19.2% went to roads, 17.9 went to their 
own Garage, and 13.8% stayed in the cars.  The survey 
asked the respondent who chose to stay at home (Fig.3), 
35.7% of them answered because they had the elderly in 
their family so they did not move to somewhere else but 
home. 
3.3 Survey 2: Social survey of the Care Managers and 
Senior Citizens  
3.3.1 Subjects of this survey 
Survey (2) included 23 care managers that provided 
home-based nursing care support in Ojiya City and 399 
senior citizens, who were sent to welfare facilities for the 
elderly or hospitals during the emergency evacuation.  
Since it is difficult for some seniors to answer the 
Fig.2  After the impact, which place were you evacuated to ? 












































































questionnaire, we asked the care managers, which cared 
for the senior citizens that evacuated to welfare facilities 
or hospitals, to answer the questions on the seniors’ 
behalf. 
3.3.2 Results of Survey 2 
(1) The general situation 
The questionnaires were distributed on January 15, 
2005 through the Geriatric Welfare Division, Ojiya City 
Office, and collected on January 31, 2005.  A 100% 
response rate was achieved with the assistance of the 
Geriatric Welfare Division since all 23 care managers 
that provide home-based nursing care in Ojiya City 
responded to Questionnaire-A in Survey (2). 
Questionnaire-B was distributed to 399 senior citizens, 
although 382 were returned, only 257 were assessed to 
be useful for the survey.  Consequently, the effective 
response rate was 64.4%. 
(2) Situation of the senior citizens received at welfare 
facilities and hospitals in Ojiya City after the 
Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake 
The graph in Fig. 4, which is based on the data from 
the Geriatric Welfare Division, Ojiya City, 
chronologically shows the extent that care managers 
coped with the emergency evacuation needs.  The 
division accumulated the data by calling the welfare 
facilities and hospitals to confirm the senior citizens 
received during the emergency evacuation based on 
reports from the care managers.  The division continued 
calling the facilities and hospitals until December 12, 
2004, and the total number of people received reached 
399.  On the day of the earthquake, the need for 
emergency evacuations arose mainly for “the elderly, 
who are highly dependent on medical care”.  The needs 
then shifted to “senior citizens, who have difficulties 
staying at the shelters for a long period.”  The needs 
peaked on October 27, 4 days after the earthquake (Fig. 
4).
(3) Actual situation of the elderly received at welfare 
facilities or hospitals during the emergency evacuation 
The average age of the 257 “senior citizens received 
during the emergency evacuation” was 84.  89.9% were 
75 or older, 6.2% were 65 to 74, and 3.9% were under 65. 
The reasons for the emergency hospitalization or 
reception at welfare facilities were: 1) their houses were 
damaged and it became impossible to receive 
home-based nursing care (58.2%), 2) it became 
impossible for the family member(s) to care for them at 
home (19.5%), 3) their facilities suffered physical 
damage (8.6%), 4) their needs changed  (2.3%), 5) their 
conditions changed (1.8%), 6) they evacuated outside the 
city (1.8%), and 7) other (7.8%). The resources 
supported the home-based care decreased by 77.7%.  
Before the earthquake, 65.9% of the received seniors 



















































































































































































































Total number confirmed before 







































































































































































dwelled at home and 27.1% resided in welfare facilities 
(Others were 7%).  On the day of the earthquake, 
37.1% stayed in a tent or a car, 16.3% evacuated to 
shelters, 17.6% stayed in welfare facilities, 6.9% stayed 
in hospitals, and 10.6% remained at home.  Two to four 
days after the earthquake, 20% were still living in tents, 
cars, or shelters.  One week after the earthquake, the 
number of senior citizens received at welfare facilities 
and hospitals increased and peaked one month after the 
earthquake.  By that time, 61.7% had moved to welfare 
facilities and 23.0% to hospitals (Others were 15.3%).  
Two months after the earthquake, the number of 
seniors at welfare facilities and hospitals decreased, 
implying that they started to return home.  However, 
three months after the earthquake only 42.0% of the 
received seniors had returned home (Fig. 5). 
(4) Senior citizens returning home from hospitals/welfare 
facilities
Figure 6 chronologically compares “the number of 
senior citizens received at hospitals/welfare facilities 
during the emergency evacuation” and “the number of 
evacuees staying at shelters”.  The number of evacuees 
peaked five days after the earthquake.  29,000 of the 
44,000 residents in Ojiya City evacuated.  The number 
of evacuees started to decline two weeks after the 
earthquake and all of them returned home by December 
20, 2004.  On the other hand, the number of elderly 
people received at welfare facilities and hospitals during 
the emergency evacuation increased in accordance with 
the increase of evacuees at the shelters and peaked 12 
days after the earthquake.  Although the number of 
evacuees sharply declined two weeks after the 
earthquake, the number of the seniors at the welfare 
facilities and hospitals did not decline as rapidly.  The 
number of senior citizens staying at welfare facilities and 
hospital gradually declined to 177 as of December 12.  
These finding suggest that the senior citizens, who 
needed care, were unable to reconstruct their lives 
compared to the other evacuees.  Via a verbal 
confirmation on February 17, 2005, 67 seniors were still 
at hospitals and welfare facilities. As of May 27, 2005, 
that number decreased to 50. Thus, our current task is to 
help these 50 seniors return to their own homes. 
4. Observations and Conclusions 
An essential issue in disaster planning is how to help 
people that have difficulties evacuating by themselves.  
Typically, the welfare services that support the life of 
these people are only provided during fixed hours and 
are unable to handle abrupt catastrophic disasters.   
Nevertheless, care managers play a pivotal role in the 







































current welfare service and are knowledgeable about 
senior citizens and their need for assistance when a 
disaster occurs.  Care managers also have a strong sense 
of responsibility for the safety of people in need.  Thus, 
these care managers must be involved in developing 
individual evacuation plans for future senior citizens that 
need support.  Since care managers determine the 
evacuation plan for senior citizens, who require care, 
individuals and organizations, which will become the 
life-saving resources in an emergency, must be secured.  
Once these resources are ascertained, the administration, 
the welfare-related employees, and the community need 
to simulate evacuations and provide training in order to 
improve the disaster prevention abilities of the 
community. 
After the emergency period of the Mid-Niigata 
Prefecture Earthquake was over, the care managers 
mainly provided support to the elderly requiring care by 
facilitating their reception at welfare facilities and 
hospitals.  However, there are fundamental issues. 1) 
The facilities were selected from the limited options 
within the care managers’ network.  It was difficult to 
select the facilities that might help these seniors 
reconstruct their lives. 2) These seniors tended to have 
prolonged stays at these facilities.  In Ojiya City, which 
was hit by the Mid-Niigata Prefecture Earthquake, more 
than 50 senior citizens (as of May 27, 2005 when this 
paper is written) had yet to return to their previous lives 
within the community. 
The resources available to care receivers living at 
home decreased due to the disaster, which prevented 
these seniors from leaving the hospitals and welfare 
facilities, and returning home. 
Hence, a new special area called “disaster care 
management” must be established.  This area allows 
care managers to play a leading role in systematizing 
knowledge, techniques, and networking for total care 
management during a disaster and remain within the 
framework of nursing care insurance system. 
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Fig.6  Comparison of the number of people staying at shelters and the number of senior citizens evacuated to hospital/welfare 
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